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tax deductible.1 Traditionally, most advertising costs
are specifically included within these tax deductions.2 While
advertising generally serves as a useful channel to inform
consumers, the direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of
prescription drugs should not, and need not constitutionally,
be treated the same as other advertising. As the Magazine
Publishers’ Association put it, “You can learn all you need to
know about beer in [thirty] seconds. But, a prescription
drug?” 3 Prescription drugs have the ability to improve
people’s health when appropriately prescribed, but can have a
range of negative short- and long-term consequences when
inappropriately used. Prescribing decisions should therefore
be based on scientific evidence with the goal of obtaining the
best possible treatment, instead of making additional profits
Thus, Congress could consider
for the drug companies.4
revoking the tax deductions for DTCA as a means of imposing
a “sin tax” 5 to disincentivize spending on DTCA without
running afoul of regulating speech.6
Proponents of DTCA argue that it provides important
benefits, such as improving public health by encouraging
viewers to speak with their doctors about health problems
Opponents, however,
that might otherwise go untreated.7
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1. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2006).
2. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(j) (saying that “certain foreign advertising expenses”
are explicitly excluded); see also, e.g., Poletti v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 818, 822
(8th Cir. 1964).
3. Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-To-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising,
25 AM. J.L. & MED. 149, 164 (1999) (citing an advertisement which appeared in
the Wall Street Journal).
4. See Ray Moynihan et al., Selling Sickness: The Pharmaceutical Industry
and Disease Mongering, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 886, 886 (2002) [hereinafter
Moynihan et al., Selling Sickness] (stating that “[i]nappropriate medicalization
carries the dangers of unnecessary labelling, [sic] poor treatment decisions,
iatrogenic illness, and economic waste, as well as the opportunity costs that
result when resources are diverted away from treating or preventing more
serious disease”).
5. See Rachel E. Morse, Resisting the Path of Least Resistance: Why the
Texas “Pole Tax” and the New Class of Modern Sin Taxes Are Bad Policy, 29
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 189, 191 (2009) (explaining sin taxes as “targeted excise
taxes imposed on the sale of disfavored goods or services” which are commonly
used in connection with alcohol and tobacco).
6. See generally David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business
Deductions in a Net Income Tax System, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1251
(2011) (discussing sin taxes and the common use thereof to encourage or
discourage non-tax behavior).
7. This point, however, is undisputed. Indeed, some believe that DTCA
has a positive impact. See, e.g., Mark B. McClellan, MD, Ph.D., FDA
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argue that DTCA disperses deceptive information, hinders
the patient-doctor relationship, encourages patients to choose
drug-based solutions over lifestyle-based ones, reduces the
amount spent on research and development, and increases
spending on drugs without a corresponding health benefit.8
Indeed, DTCA spending has out-paced spending on research
and development 9 and the prevalence of Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) warning letters demonstrates
pharmaceutical companies’ frequent failures to comply
with advertising regulations that the FDA is underresourced to police.10 During September 2010 alone, the FDA
issued eleven warning letters to pharmaceutical companies
primarily regarding “internet marketing of unapproved and
misbranded drugs.”11 The problem with DTCA has “attracted
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Commissioner, Speech before First International Colloquium on Generic
Medicine (Sept. 25, 2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Speeches/ucm053614.htm (stating that “on net [DTC] advertising benefits the
public health” and also arguing that “although the ads are highly visible, they
account for less than 2 percent of U.S. pharmaceutical spending, and so they
can’t be a key driver of drug costs”); see also Frank Lichtenberg & Gautier
Duflos, Time Release: The Effect of Patent Expiration on U.S. Drug Prices,
Marketing and Utilization by the Public, 11 MED. PROGRESS REP. 1, 12 (2009)
(explaining that “marketing has a significant impact on utilization” which in
turn improves public health and therefore restrictions on advertising should be
carefully considered).
8. See, e.g., Marcia Angell, Relationships with the Drug Industry: Keep at
Arm’s Length, 338 BRIT. MED. J. b222 (2009) [hereinafter Angell, Relationships]
(explaining that DTCA is often aimed at “me-too drugs and are designed to
convince viewers that one is better than another, despite the fact that these
drugs are seldom compared in clinical trials at equivalent doses. Many seek to
convince people that they have chronic disorders that require lifelong drug
treatment . . . . with the implication that it needs to be treated to prevent
serious complications . . . . We need to stop accepting the fiction that marketing,
whether to prescribers or patients, is good education.”).
9. See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 132–33 (2004) [hereinafter
ANGELL, THE TRUTH]. U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-0754, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA’S OVERSIGHT OF
DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING 5, 12 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter GAO-07-54],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0754.pdf.
10. See, e.g., Bad Ad Program: FDA Aims to Keep Drug Promotion Truthful,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/
ConsumerUpdates/ucm211791.htm; Susan Heavey & Lisa Richwine, Special
Report: Outgunned FDA Tries to Get Tough with Drug Ads, REUTERS (Sept. 3,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/03/us-drugs-advertising-idUSTRE
6821PN20100903.
11. Warning Letters 2009, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFD
A/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm
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enough congressional attention to warrant at least six bills in
the 110th Congress as well as concerns from members in the
111th.”12 For instance, the Say No to Drug Ads Act of 2009
proposed the removal of tax deductions specifically for
DTCA.13 Yet, to the relief of the drug companies and the
marketing industry, multiple bills introduced to Congress
proposing to remove the tax deductions have not been
passed.14 Neither this Article nor the proposed legislation
discussed herein suggests that pharmaceutical companies’
ability to advertise should be revoked. As Congressman
Daniel Lipinski said, “I am not looking to infringe upon any
company’s right to advertise, only to help assure that the
American taxpayers are not subsidizing these industries in
our health care system.”15
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055773.htm (last updated June 27, 2011).
12. SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40590, DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 3 (2009) [hereinafter THAUL, CRS
REPORT], available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40590_20090520.pdf
(“Members of the 111th Congress have indicated interest in DTC advertising in
the context of drug safety, tax treatment of advertising expenses, risk
communication, and general FDA-activity authority and oversight, sometimes
in the context of broader discussions of health care costs and reform.”).
13. H.R. 2966, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating that “[n]o deduction shall be
allowed . . . for any amount paid or incurred for a direct-to-consumer
advertisement of a prescription drug”); S. 2842, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating that
“[n]o deduction shall be allowed . . . for expenses relating to direct to consumer
advertising in any media for the sale and use of prescription pharmaceuticals
for any taxable year”); S. 2873, 111th Cong. (2009) (same). Some of the
proposed legislation, such as the Protecting Americans from Drug Marketing
Act of 2009, proposed revoking tax deductions for all pharmaceutical
advertising and promotion. H.R. 3979, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating that “[n]o
deduction shall be allowed . . . for expenses relating to advertising or promoting
the sale and use of prescription pharmaceuticals for any taxable year” and
defining “advertising or promoting” to include “direct to consumer advertising in
any media and any activity designed to promote the use of prescription
pharmaceutical directed to providers or others who may make decisions about
the use or prescription pharmaceuticals”); S. 1763, 111th Cong. (2009) (same);
H.R. 2917, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating that “[n]o deduction shall be allowed . . .
with respect to (1) any advertisement primarily for purpose of promoting the
sale or use of any prescribed drug”).
14. H.R. 2917; John Eggerton, Health Care Bill Won’t End Tax Deductions
for Prescription Drug Ads, BENTON FOUND. (July 15, 2009), http://www.benton.
org/node/26474.
15. Letter from Representative Daniel Lipinski to Representative Charles
B. Rangel and Representative Dave Camp (July 15, 2009) [hereinafter Lipinski
Letter]. For more information on Congressman Daniel Lipinski, see his
website, http://www.lipinski.house.gov/.
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16. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011) (“State[s] may
not seek to remove a popular but disfavored product from the marketplace by
prohibiting truthful, nonmisleading advertisements that contain impressive
endorsements or catchy jingles. That [a s]tate finds expression too persuasive
does not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden its messengers.”).
17. Advertising pharmaceuticals directly to consumers is suspect regardless
of who is responsible for the advertisement. Particularly in light of Sorrell,
Congress must be wary of focusing on a particular viewpoint or speaker. See id.
at 2663–64.
18. See generally Walker, supra note 6, at 1251.
19. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162 (2006).
20. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
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The First Amendment protects the pharmaceutical
industry’s commercial free speech and right to advertise,
and prevents Congress from either imposing contentand speaker-based restrictions16 or prohibiting industry from
spending on DTCA. Also, as previously mentioned, DTCA
proponents present several compelling arguments more
thoroughly discussed below. It is not necessary, however, to
continue to allow tax deductions for DTCA in order to
maintain those benefits and the constitution does not require
the continued allowance of a tax deduction. The arguments
for disincentivizing DTCA apply regardless of the content.
The focus is on the listener, not the speaker. The tendency of
drug advertising to mislead merely provides a facially-neutral
justification for revoking the deductions.17
The Tax Code is regularly and frequently used for
social engineering to affect non-tax behaviors.18 Congress
allows tax breaks for actions or behaviors they want to
encourage and denies them, or imposes sin taxes for those
they wish to discourage or believe have low social value.19
Even constitutionally important topics such as religious
donations and gun purchases may be taxed, or exempted, by
legislative decision.
Here, forcing the pharmaceutical
industry to internalize the full cost of advertising by
removing the subsidy may encourage them to consider more
carefully whether their ads’ content complies with FDA
regulations aimed at accurate portrayals of the drugs.
Thereby, Congress could reduce DTCA without violating the
First Amendment through outright bans or restrictions based
on an ad’s content or speaker. Further, removing tax
deductions also results in administrative simplification and is
therefore a preferred means of attempting to address
non-tax behaviors.20 One such bill was estimated to raise
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Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 958 (2004) [hereinafter Weisbach &
Nussim, Tax and Spending].
21. See Ryan J. Donmoyer, House Considering $37 Billion Drug Tax, Rangel
Says, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=aeEJZicjYE60.
22. See generally Walker, supra note 6, at 1251–53.
23. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
24. Id. at 2672.
25. Id.
26. See Walker, supra note 6 at 1251–53; RxP Weekly Reader: Bailout
Edition, POSTSCRIPT (Oct. 2, 2008), http://postscript.communitycatalyst.org/
?p=223 (“The FDA has warned five drug makers about false or misleading
advertisements of five ADHD drugs, according to the Bureau of National Affairs
Health Care Daily Report.”).
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approximately $37 billion in revenue, which would not
prevent the industry from advertising, but could help cover
the cost of other government programs and likely reduce
the overall prominence of DTCA.21 Thus, removing the tax
deductions for DTCA is constitutionally permissible, properly
aligned with public policy,22 and Congress could remove the
deductions.
This Article first discusses the factual and legal
background leading up to the proposed DTCA tax deduction
removal, including: a brief history of DTCA regulation,
pharmaceutical industry promotion and its effects, the
relevant IRC provisions and constitutional limits on
Congress’ power. Next, this Article examines the legal and
policy reasons why the removal of the tax deductions is
advisable and permissible. Specifically, the removal would
not infringe upon the First Amendment-protected commercial
free speech, even under heightened-scrutiny as recently
applied in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.23 In Sorrell, the Court
maintained that regulatory differences between industries
would still survive a constitutional challenge if there was
reason to believe that fraud was more likely in one industry.24
The Court also suggested that it might be more flexible with
respect to consumer protection matters. 25 This reasoning
should apply to the revocation of deductions for DTCA which
generally does not explain alternative therapies and may
interfere with the doctor-patient relationship leading
to excess prescribing, thereby contributing to the cost of
health care without a correspondingly healthier population.26
Additionally, Congress has disallowed, and the Supreme
Court has approved, the revocation of deductions in many
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other instances as within Congress’ broad authority under the
Sixteenth Amendment to both tax the public and revoke
deductions.27 Further, lobbying, which like DTCA occurs in
the ordinary course of business and aims to persuade people,
is specifically not tax-exempt due to Congress’ concern over
“undue influence[.]”28 Yet Congress allows full tax deductions
for DTCA.
This Article also addresses why implementing a
disincentive through the IRC would be preferable to
increasing FDA regulation. First, utilizing the IRC would be
more practical and involve fewer administrative costs.
Second, FDA faces constitutional limitations on its ability
to monitor advertisements’ content. Finally, this Article
acknowledges several potential problems with the deductions’
removal and offers that while a complete removal is
preferred, Congress should in the alternative consider
instituting a cap on the amount deductible for DTCA
spending.
I.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS AND LAW

A. A Brief History of DTCA Regulation

04/16/2012 17:10:32

27. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983) (approving removal of tax exempt status); New Colonial Ice Co.
v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181,
192 (2008) (“noting the familiar rule that an income tax deduction is a matter of
legislative grace” (citing INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84
(1992) (internal quotations omitted))).
28. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried
About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 496 (2008) [hereinafter Mayer, Lobbying].
29. Michael S. Wilkes, Robert A. Bell & Richard L. Kravitz, Direct-ToConsumer Prescription Drug Advertising: Trends, Impact, and Implications, 19
HEALTH AFF. 110, 112 (2000), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/
content/19/2/110.full.pdf.
30. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., IMPACT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING
ON PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 4 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/
rxdrugs/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14378.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 93 Side A

Richard G. Frank, Professor of Health Economics at
Harvard Medical School, defines DTCA as “any promotional
effort by a pharmaceutical company to present prescription
drug information to the general public in the lay media.”29
This “includes advertisements targeted toward consumers
through magazines, newspapers, television, radio, and
outdoor advertising.”30 DTCA encompasses three categories:
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help-seeking ads, reminder ads, and product-claim ads. 31
Help-seeking ads aim to get viewers to see their doctor about
a particular condition, but do not mention any specific drug or
treatment.32 Reminder ads state the name of the drug—but
do not discuss the condition it treats or make health claims—
and the FDA does not require full risk disclosure.33 Finally,
product-claim ads include both the drug’s name and
therapeutic claims and must include full risk information.34
In recognition of the weaknesses of the Pure Food and
Drugs Act of 1906 and Federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetics
Act of 1938 to address advertising, Congress passed the 1962
Kefauver-Harris Amendments. These amendments, directed
at advertising to physicians, transferred regulatory authority
for pharmaceutical marketing from the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to FDA.35 These amendments required
that ads not be false or misleading, present a fair balance of
the drug’s risks and benefits, contain facts relevant to the
advertised and approved use, list contraindications, and be
submitted to FDA upon publication.36 DTCA first attracted
the FDA’s attention in the early 1980s.37 Following a brief
voluntary moratorium to study the practice, FDA deemed the
1960s regulations regarding physician advertising adequate
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31. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 4–5.
32. Id. at 4. Please note that these ads tend to be coordinated by the
company to coincide with heavy marketing to doctors about a particular drug.
U.S. GEN’L ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Report, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA
OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 11 (Oct.
2002) (stating that “DTC advertising is concentrated among a small number of
drugs for chronic conditions and many of these same drugs are also promoted to
physicians, both factors that may lead to increased sales.”).
33. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 4–5. The Report also notes that
these ads are primarily directed towards providers who already have a base
knowledge of the product. Id.
34. Id. at 5.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2006).
36. For a more in-depth discussion of the history of regulation, see Victor E.
Schwartz et al., Marketing Pharmaceutical Products in the Twenty-First
Century: An Analysis of the Continued Viability of Traditional Principles of Law
in the Age of Direct-To-Consumer Advertising, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 333,
336–40 (2009) [hereinafter Schwartz, Viability]; THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra
note 12, at 8–14.
37. Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on Direct-to-Consumer
Promotion, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 489, 491–92 (1999) [hereinafter Pines, DTC
History]; see also Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 336–37 (stating that
“[c]ompanies that sell medications have advertised their products directly to
consumers since the beginning of medicine”).
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to apply to DTCA.38 As a result of the cumbersome summary
requirements, these regulations effectively prohibited
broadcast DTCA.39
Interestingly, one study conducted by the FDA in the
1980s, which in-part led to the allowance of DTCA, found that
consumers retained more information regarding the drug’s
benefits than its risks, and that print ads are relatively more
effective than broadcast ones at conveying risk information.40
Yet, the FDA deemed that presenting only a “fair balance” of
the risks and benefits was necessary to inform consumers
effectively.41 Other than a January 2009 guidance regarding
what device manufacturers, drug manufacturers or
representatives may disseminate regarding off-label usage,42
the regulations have remained relatively constant and there
remains no distinction between the FDA’s regulations for
physician and consumer advertising.43
Initially, the FDA did not allow product-specific
advertisements.44 Drug companies could either advertise
symptoms with a message for consumers to see their doctor or
mention the name of a product, but could not indicate
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38. Pines, DTC History, supra note 37, at 492; Prescription Drug Promotion:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce &
Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 107th Cong. (2001)
[hereinafter Ostrove Testimony], available at http://www.fda.gov/News
Events/Testimony/ucm115206.htm (statement of Nancy M. Ostrove, Ph.D.,
Deputy Director, Food & Drug Admin.) (“On September 9, 1985, FDA withdrew
the moratorium in a Federal Register (FR) Notice (50 FR 36677), which stated
that the ‘current regulations governing prescription drug advertising provide
sufficient safeguards to protect consumers.’ ” ).
39. See Ostrove Testimony, supra note 38.
40. Pines, DTC History, supra note 37, at 492; see also Joel J. Davis,
Consumers’ Preferences for the Communication of Risk Information in Drug
Advertising, 26 HEALTH AFF. 863, 863–64 (2007) (citing Kathryn Aikin, The
Impact of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising on the PhysicianPatient Relationship (Sept. 22, 2003)).
41. The FTC has also recognized potential problems with the conveyance of
risk information to consumers in advertisements. See FTC Staff Provides
Comments to FDA on Direct-to-Consumer Drug and Device Ads, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (May 12, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/05/dtcdrugs.shtm.
42. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND
MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES
OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009),
available at http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.
htm.
43. See Ostrove Testimony, supra note 38.
44. Pines, DTC History, supra note 37, at 494.
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45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Sidney M. Wolfe, Editorial, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising—
Education or Emotion Promotion?, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 524, 525 (2002).
48. According to Claritin’s website, about fifty million Americans are
affected by allergies. Questions & Answers, CLARITIN, http://www.claritin.com/
claritin/learn/questions-answers.jspa#question4 (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
49. Jeremy A. Greene & David Herzberg, Hidden in Plain Sight: Marketing
Prescription Drugs to Consumers in the Twentieth Century, 100 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 793, 800 (2010).
50. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED
BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125064.pdf [hereinafter FDA
1999 GUIDANCE]; see also Ostrove Testimony, supra note 38.
51. FDA 1999 GUIDANCE, supra note 50, at 1.

31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 94 Side B

its purpose.45 For example, these regulations permitted a
commercial advertising the prescription drug Claritin,
featuring only a singer crooning about “blue skies” and a
“kind voice instruct[ing] the viewer to ‘see your doctor about
Claritin.’ ” 46 Incidentally, this ad does not educate the public
regarding a disease or treatment thereby failing to satisfy the
pharmaceutical industry’s primary justification for DTCA.
Rather than educate the public, the message appeals
to the individual’s emotions.47 Calm, cloudless, blue skies
present a soothing image and a carefree outlook. The
advertisement, for an allergy medication, could just as easily
promote a statin or antipsychotic drug. These advertisements
grab viewers’ attention, but not because they suffer from a
debilitating allergy. Curious, the viewer will ask his doctor
and as a result may discover some low-grade allergy.48 In
American culture, with the promotion of perfection and quickfixes, those with very mild symptoms would likely disregard
the side effects and opt to take the drug when no treatment or
a generic, cheaper drug would also suffice. In 1995,
“[c]oncerned that consumers were confused by the choppy
nature of broadcast DTC advertising,” the FDA held a
“hearing on the putative risks and benefits of easing its
regulation” and in 1997 began to allow product-specific
advertisements.49
Simultaneously, the FDA also released the “Guidance for
Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements.”50
For print ads, the guidance still required a “brief summary”
listing all the risks in the drug’s prescribing information and
at least one FDA-approved use.51 Alternatively, recognizing
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that the not-so-brief summary information presented an
insurmountable challenge in a thirty- or sixty-second
commercial, the FDA eased the requirements for broadcast
ads.52 This change allowed industry to include only an
“adequate provision” with a “major statement” of the
most important risk information that informs viewers
or listeners where to find the full FDA-approved
prescribing information.53 In the wake of the DTCA
regulatory relaxation, the pharmaceutical industry spends
the majority of its DTCA budget on television commercials.54
In 2004, FDA issued a draft Guidance for Industry
entitled “Brief Summary: Disclosing Risk Information in
Consumer-Directed Print Advertisements.” 55 The guidance
again
distinguishes
between
print
and
broadcast
advertisements, requiring a brief summary for print ads, but
not for broadcast ads. This, however, may be a distinction without a difference.56 While the guidance “strongly
encourages the use of consumer-friendly language in all
consumer-directed materials,” the “FDA cannot object . . .
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52. Id.
53. Id. at 2.
54. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROMOTIONAL SPENDING FOR PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS 3 (2009) [hereinafter CBO REPORT]; Peter Lurie, DTC Advertising
Harms Patients and Should Be Tightly Regulated, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 444,
444 (2009) (describing the FDA’s removal of the brief summary requirement as
the “regulatory change that produced the growth in DTC advertising”); Caroline
L. Nadal, The Societal Value of Prescription Drug Advertisements in the New
Millennium: Targeted Consumers Become the Learned, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 451, 479–
80 (2001) (explaining that as result of the FDA “relax[ing] its guidelines for
product-specific television and radio ads . . . . DTC marketing [grew]
exponentially with pharmaceutical manufacturers spending almost $1.9 billion
on DTC advertisements in 1999, more than triple what they spent in 1996”);
Shannon Pettypiece, Less Sex, Rock-n-Roll as Drugmakers React to FDA TV Ad
Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news
?pid=newsarchive&sid=aVe6AAgRw_0Y.
55. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BRIEF SUMMARY:
DISCLOSING
RISK
INFORMATION
IN
CONSUMER-DIRECTED
PRINT
ADVERTISEMENTS (2004) [hereinafter FDA 2004 DRAFT GUIDANCE], available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformatio
n/Guidances/ucm069984.pdf. While the FDA refers to the guidance as a “draft,”
it reflects the Administration’s current practice. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra
note 12, at 11.
56. See, e.g., DDMAC Frequently Asked Questions, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ucm090308.htm
(last
updated June 18, 2009) (The “FDA has also heard concerns about the lack of
value of the required information [in the brief summary] from some individuals
and groups.”).
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solely on the basis that the risk information is not presented
in consumer-friendly language.”57 Accordingly, to satisfy the
brief summary requirement many manufacturers include the
full FDA-approved labeling.58 Nevertheless, as the FDA
astutely points out, providing the full labeling information “is
less than optimal.”59 In effect, the FDA admits that while this
approach complies with the regulations, it fails to convey the
information necessary to educate consumers appropriately.60
Thus, the additional brief summary requirement in print ads
does not prove any more effective in communicating
appropriate use, benefit, and risk information to consumers.
In 2006, Congress amended the Lanham Act designed to
prevent false advertising claims.61 The Act provides, in part,
a civil penalty for anyone who “in commercial advertising or
promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.” 62 The
statute further allows for “action by any person who believes
that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”63
Congress also addressed DTCA in the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA).64 First,
the FDAAA authorized the FDA to charge industry a fee to
review DTCA prior to publication in order to fund the
additional staff essential to that task.65 In January of 2008,
however, the FDA announced it would not implement this
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 95 Side B
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57. FDA 2004 DRAFT GUIDANCE, supra note 55, at 1.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id. at 2.
60. Id. (“Although this approach complies with the brief summary
requirement, FDA believes it is less than optimal for consumer-directed print
advertisements because many consumers do not have the technical background
to understand this information. Moreover, the volume of the material, coupled
with the format in which it is presented (i.e., very small print and sophisticated
medical terminology) discourages its use and makes the information less
comprehensible to consumers. In general, FDA believes that exhaustive lists of
minor risks distract from and make it difficult to comprehend and retain
information on the more important risks. FDA also believes that information
intended for a consumer should optimally be communicated in language fully
understandable by a lay reader and presented in an easily readable format.”).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 110–85, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
65. 21 U.S.C.A. § 379h-1.
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program.66 Second, the FDAAA authorized the FDA to
require submission of television ads at least forty-five days
before their airdate, after which the Secretary may
recommend, but not require or actually make, changes to the
advertisement.67 This expanded authority has also not been
utilized. Third, the FDAAA sets forth civil penalties for
the sponsoring of false or misleading DTCA.68 Finally, the
FDAAA required all DTCA to include a statement
encouraging the reporting of negative side effects.69
FDA only reviews ads once published, but even then does
not review all ads.70 When the FDA discovers a violation,
their enforcement options include: sending an untitled letter
or a warning letter, imposing a civil monetary penalty,
criminally prosecuting the company, seizing a product,
or withdrawing their approval for sale. 71 Upon finding a
problem with an ad, the FDA typically responds first with an
untitled letter, also known as a notice of violation, then a
warning letter, and finally an injunction.72 Despite the FDA’s
contention that warning letters serve as a sufficient threat to
prevent the need for further action, their prevalence indicates
that by themselves they are an insufficient regulatory tool.73
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66. User Fee Program for Advisory Review of Direct-to-Consumer Television
Advertisements for Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Program Will
Not Be Implemented, 73 Fed. Reg. 2924 (Jan. 16, 2008).
67. 21 U.S.C.A. § 353b.
68. 21 U.S.C.A. § 333. The FDAAA established that the maximum penalty
would be $250,000 for the first offence, and $500,000 for any subsequent offence
in a three-year period. However, the repeated dissemination of the same ad
only counts as one violation.
69. 21 U.S.C.A. § 352(n). The statute requires that the following statement
be included: “You are encouraged to report negative side effects of prescription
drugs to the FDA. Visit www.fda.gov/medwatch, or call 1-800-FDA-1088.” Id.
70. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-54, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN FDA’S OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
ADVERTISING 5 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0754.pdf.
71. Id. at 11.
72. DONNA U. VOGT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32853, DIRECT-TOCONSUMER ADVERTISING OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 29 (2005), available at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL328530325
2005.pdf (stating that “FDA believes that the . . . warning letter is a powerful
tool in its regulatory arsenal”).
73. See Warning Letters, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/default.htm (last updated Oct. 4,
2011); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-177, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 21–
22 (2002) [hereinafter FDA OVERSIGHT], available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03177.pdf.
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B. Pharmaceutical Industry Promotion and its Effects
Following the 1997 DTCA regulatory relaxation,
promotional spending across the pharmaceutical industry
increased from $11.4 billion in 1996 to $29.9 billion in 2005.74
In 2008, the pharmaceutical industry spent $20.5 billion,
placing them second only to the auto industry in
advertising.75 The rate of increase in promotional spending
has out-paced spending on research and development.76
Currently, the United States spends 17.3% of the Gross
Domestic Product on healthcare, outpatient pharmaceuticals
accounting for approximately 10% of those costs. 77 While
DTCA, at about $4.2 billion, represents only a small fraction
of pharmaceutical industry spending, it is continually
expanding and, as proponents and opponents of DTCA agree,
effective.78
Despite attempts by the FDA to require a balanced
portrayal of the risks and benefits of each drug, such a
balance is unlikely. 79 The pharmaceutical industry has a
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74. Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Prescription Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 673 (2007) [hereinafter
Donohue, A Decade of DTCA], available at http://www.nejm.org/
doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa070502.
75. Noreen O’Leary, Sen. Bill Nelson Backs off on Drug Ads, ADWEEK (Sept.
16, 2009), http://www.adweek.com/news/advertising-branding/sen-bill-nelsonbacks-drug-ads-100360. This number actually represents a decline from the
industry’s peak spending in 2006, which amounted to $5.2 billion. See CBO
REPORT, supra note 54, at 2. But see ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 122
(explaining that the exact amount spent yearly by industry is unclear, but
higher than they report).
76. GAO-07-54, supra note 9, at 5, 12; Lipinski Letter, supra note 15
(explaining that “[s]pending by drug companies on consumer advertising has
quadrupled since 1996, even outpacing spending on research and
development”); FDA OVERSIGHT, supra note 73, at 9.
77. See Micah Hartman et al., Health Spending Growth at a Historic Low in
2008, 29 HEALTH AFF. 147, 148 exhibit 1 (2010).
78. See ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 123; Donohue, A Decade of
DTCA, supra note 74, at 675 (stating that at $4.2 billion “[i]n 2005, only 14% of
total industry expenditures on pharmaceutical promotion were devoted to such
advertising.”); Faith McLellan, US Government Report Released on Deceptive
Drug Advertisements, 360 LANCET 1951, 1951 (2002), available at
http://www.lancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2802%29119477/fulltext (stating that every year approximately 8.5 million people request and
receive prescriptions as a result of DTCA).
79. Cf. Joanna K. Sax, Protecting Scientific Integrity: The Commercial
Speech Doctrine Applied to Industry Publications, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 205
(2011). Sax found that even the research used to support drugs tends to be
slanted. Id.
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clear financial incentive to aggressively promote their
products. Drug companies are for-profit businesses and
spend billions each year to advertise because the industry
receives a high return on this investment.80 Studies have
shown that each $1 spent on advertising yields between about
$4.20 and $6.50 in drug sales.81 The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) reported that “the [ten drugs] with the highest
DTC expenditures in 2008 accounted for [thirty] percent
of expenditures for DTC advertising industrywide.”82 This
increase in drug use and profits, however, does not
correlate with a healthier population.83 Rather, pharmaceutical advertising results in the overuse of brand-name
prescription drugs and more expensive treatments instead of

Id.

Previous studies demonstrate that industry publications have a bias in
that they tend to report positive results of clinical trials. This is not
surprising because industry has a profit-seeking motive and companies
are likely to closely monitor the progress and process of a research
study in such a way that adverse results may be suppressed leading to
the publication of biased results.
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80. Terzian, supra note 3, at 166–67; see also Schwartz, Viability, supra
note 36, at 335; Lichtenberg & Duflos, supra note 7, at 12 (stating that
“marketing has a significant impact on utilization”); QIUPING GU ET AL., NAT’L
CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 42, PRESCRIPTION DRUG
USE CONTINUES TO INCREASE: U.S. PRESCRIPTION DRUG DATA FOR 2007–2008 1
(2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db42.pdf.
81. Lipinski Letter, supra note 15; THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at
25. But see Heavy Drug Ad Spending Doesn’t Pay Off, MARKETINGCHARTS (Apr.
12, 2010), http://www.marketingcharts.com/television/heavy-drug-ad-spendingdoesnt-pay-off-12554/ (stating that advertising spending does not necessarily
correlate with profits).
82. CBO REPORT, supra note 54, at 4–5 (discussing the drugs in the CBO’s
data set); see also Donohue, A Decade of DTCA, supra note 74, at 676 (“The 20
drugs with the highest spending made up 54.4% of total industry spending on
advertising in 2005 . . . .”).
83. See, e.g., THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 1, 21 (noting that
DTCA “are susceptible to marketing needs that interfere with objective
presentations” and “the American Medical Association (AMA) Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs . . . found . . . that 44% of promotional material to
physicians ‘would lead to improper prescribing,’ ” and recommended that
providers “remain vigilant to ensure that DTC advertising does not promote
expectations”); Jared A. Favole, FDA Warns Drug Companies On Promotional
Material, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Feb. 3, 2010 (noting warnings issued to
major pharmaceutical companies Eli Lilly & Co., United Therapeutics Corp. and
Sanofi-Aventis SA for misleading promotional materials). But see generally,
Frank R. Lichtenberg, Effects of New Drugs on Overall Health Spending: Frank
Lichtenberg Responds, 26 HEALTH AFF. 887 (2007) (finding “that, in general,
using newer drugs has reduced nondrug costs more than it has increased drug
costs . . .”).
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equally effective, cheaper options, thereby raising the cost of
healthcare for everyone.84
“The great majority of DTC ads are for very expensive
me-too drugs that require a lot of pushing because there is no
good reason to think they are any better than drugs already
DTCA also often aims to raise the
on the market.”85
significance of a relatively innocuous temporary problem to
something far more serious. For instance, “heartburn is
elevated to gastrointestinal reflux disease, with the
implication that it needs to be treated to prevent serious
complications.”86 Once “people [are] convinced they have a
treatable medical condition, then it is an easy step to sell
them drugs to treat it.” 87 Moreover, the pharmaceutical
industry optimizes the effect of DTCA by first heavily
advertising to physicians.88 While industry and DTCA supporters refer to these efforts as education, Marcia Angell,
former New England Journal of Medicine Editor-in-Chief,
noted the fact that this “ ‘ education’ comes out of the drug
companies’ marketing budgets . . . . should tell you what is
really going on.”89
The for-profit pharmaceutical companies consider their
promotional activities’ potential benefits and liabilities. Even
if a company knows they will have to pay a penalty after, in
light of the expected revenue resulting from every dollar
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84. See, e.g., Barry Meier et al., Medicine Fueled by Marketing Intensifies
Trouble for Pain Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, § 1, at 1 (explaining how
Celebrex and Vioxx costing $2 or $3 per pill, were prescribed to many patients
could have received the same effect, more safely, from over the counter drugs for
only pennies per pill).
85. ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 124.
86. Angell, Relationships, supra note 8.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Donohue, A Decade of DTCA, supra note 74, at 679 (explaining
that “PhRMA, the industry trade group, has recommended that manufacturers
delay such campaigns for new drugs until after health professionals have been
sufficiently educated, although no details have been provided on how long a
period was deemed necessary”); ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 126. For
more information on drug detailing, see, e.g., Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth
Honka, The Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 785, 808–09 (2005); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical
Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 373, 377–79 (2000).
89. ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 135 (the comment was made by
Angell in the context of discussing “educational meetings arranged by
pharmaceutical companies for physicians,” but similarly applies to DTCA).
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spent on DTCA, the risk may be worth it to the company.90 In
tort cases, manufacturers will generally be held directly liable
to consumers for failure to warn. By contrast, as a result of
the learned intermediary doctrine, premised on the notion
that physicians are in the best position to analyze an
individual patient’s particular circumstances and the drug’s
risks and benefits, pharmaceutical manufacturers are
shielded from direct liability to consumers. 91 Practically,
however, the doctrine effectively allows the pharmaceutical
industry to blame doctors for the manufacturer’s inadequate
warnings.92 In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., the New
Jersey Supreme Court revoked the doctrine’s applicability for
DTCA, recognizing that DTCA fundamentally impacts the
doctor-patient relationship and therefore the initial policy
justifications for the doctrine no longer applied.93 Since most
states have not adopted a DTCA exception, industry shields
itself from liability in many cases and does not calculate the
full extent of potential harm from their advertisements.94
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90. See Ozlem A. Bordes, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Direct-toConsumer Advertising: Should the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Be Shielded
from Liability?, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267, 267–70 (2004); Schwartz,
Viability, supra note 36, at 356 & n.121 (explaining the doctrine and noting that
it has been abolished, at least with respect to DTCA, in New Jersey, West
Virginia, etc.).
91. Id.
92. See Bordes, supra note 90, at 278; Erin Lenhardt, Why So Glum?
Toward a Fair Balance of Competitive Interests in Direct-To-Consumer
Advertising and the Well-Being of the Mentally Ill Consumers It Targets, 15
HEALTH MATRIX 165, 166 (2005) [hereinafter Lenhardt, Why So Glum?]
(arguing that even physicians “sometimes do not realize the persuasive effect of
the spin contained [in drug advertisements]”).
93. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999). Note also that
this decision follows Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 208 (D. Mass.
1991), in which the court in a footnote allowed for an exception to the learned
intermediary doctrine anytime a manufacturer advertises directly to consumers.
Id. at 211 n.4. See also State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647
S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007) (rejecting the learned intermediary doctrine entirely,
but focusing on DTCA in particular).
94. But see Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 364–69 (arguing that
creating a DTCA exception “represent[s] unsound policy”); Victor E. Schwartz et
al., West Virginia As a Judicial Hellhole: Why Businesses Fear Litigating in
State Courts, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 757, 778–82 (2009) (discussing West Virginia’s
2007 wholesale rejection of the learned intermediary doctrine and thereby
placing it “firmly at odds with fundamental tort principles expressed in the
Second and Third Restatements”).
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Similarly, in two recent cases, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth95 and
Pliva v. Mensing,96 the Supreme Court held that federal laws
preempt products liability cases against vaccine and
pharmaceutical manufacturers, respectively. These two
cases represent a departure from the 2009 decision in Wyeth
v. Levine in which the Court held that federal law did not
preempt state strict liability tort suits.97 In declining to find
preemption, the Levine court considered the benefits of state
tort litigation including “help[ing] the FDA in its oversight
function by revealing important and previously unknown
information about product-related risks, especially during the
postapproval [sic] period, and by deterring manufacturers
from acting irresponsibly and engaging in business tactics
aimed at increasing product sales at the expense of
patient safety.”98 Accordingly, raising costs associated which
manufacturing and promotion of drugs may lead the industry
to more carefully consider the practice.
C. The Tax Code: A Potential Lever for Congress

04/16/2012 17:10:32

95. 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011).
96. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
97. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
98. Aaron Kesselheim, Safety, Supply, and Suits — Litigation and the
Vaccine Industry, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1485, 1486 (2011), available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1102182.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”).
100. 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006).
101. Deducting Business Expenses, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=109807,00.html (last updated
June 10, 2011) [hereinafter IRS Business Expenses]; see also Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113–14 (1933); 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-1 (2004).
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The Sixteenth Amendment broadly authorizes Congress
to tax incomes.99 Generally, the IRC taxes businesses and
individuals only on net income. Accordingly, the IRC allows
for the deduction of numerous expenses to try to achieve that
result, including “ordinary and necessary” business
expenses.100 The Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) definition
of ordinary corresponds with a common sense understanding
of ordinary. “An ordinary expense is one that is common and
accepted in your trade or business.” 101 Necessary, on the
other hand, is defined as to not require the expense to be
“indispensable,” but rather “one that is helpful and
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appropriate for your trade or business.” 102 Unlike tax
deductions for individuals, deductions for corporations do not
phase out at any income bracket.103
Despite the general deductible rule, a deduction is not a
matter of right. As courts have repeatedly stated, Congress
has the authority to tax gross income. In New Colonial Ice
Co. v. Helvering, the Supreme Court refused to infer a
deduction where Congress had not explicitly allowed one.104
As the Court explained, “[w]hether and to what extent
deductions shall be allowed depends upon legislative
grace.” 105 IRC section 162 exempts certain expenses as a
means of regulating and discouraging relevant non-tax
behaviors.106 For instance, neither treble damage payments
under the antitrust laws, nor certain foreign advertising
expenses are deductible.107 Additionally, home mortgages are
deductible, but rental payments are not and tax credits are
given for installing solar panels, but not for wood-burning
stoves.108 Advertising in general, however, is deductible.109
But expenses that may produce a future benefit must be
capitalized.110 The IRS, however, allows for the deduction of
advertising expenses despite the fact that a particular
campaign may last several years.111 Removing this deduction
would increase the cost of advertising thereby discouraging
industry from advertising as heavily.112 At the very least, it
would cease the taxpayer subsidy of DTCA.
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 99 Side A
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102. IRS Business Expenses, supra note 101; Welch, 290 U.S. at 113.
103. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (phasing out the allowance of a deduction for
personal exemptions when the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income exceeds a
certain amount); cf., e.g., I.R.C. § 162 (not providing any phase out amount for
allowable trade or business deductions).
104. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
105. Id.
106. Walker, supra note 6, at 1257.
107. I.R.C. § 162(g), (j).
108. I.R.C. § 162.
109. Id.
110. I.R.C. § 263A.
111. 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-20 (2004).
112. See Walker, supra note 6, at 1251 (explaining that the effect of certain
other disallowances of tax deduction “discourage[s] [the] disfavored activity”).
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D. Objections to Removing the Tax Deductions
1. Policy: Unfair to the Drug Industry113
Proponents of DTCA defend the increase in prescription
drug spending and healthcare costs by arguing
that these practices lead to an overall healthier population.114
Specifically,
DTCA
increases
consumer
knowledge,
encourages people to see their doctors by removing the
stigma, leads to the diagnosis of more diseases, reminds
patients to refill and take their prescriptions, and helps
individuals “achieve the maximum degree of material
satisfaction.”115 As many have observed, however, while the
consumer may be more informed after viewing an
advertisement, they are not necessarily better informed.116 In
light of the frequency with which FDA issues warning letters
for failure to present a fair balance of a drug’s risks and
benefits, it is clear that the quality of the information
conveyed leaves something to be desired. Moreover, even
when risks and benefits are evenly presented, consumers
retain more information regarding the advantages than the
side effects.117
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113. See Pat Kelly, DTC Advertising’s Benefits Far Outweigh Its
Imperfections, HEALTH AFF. (Apr. 28, 2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/
content/early/2004/04/28/hlthaff.w4.246.full.pdf+html.
114. See Kelly, supra note 113; Keeping Watch Over Direct-to-Consumer Ads,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/
ucm107170.htm (last updated Sept. 09, 2011) [hereinafter FDA Keeping Watch];
DTC
Prescription
Drug
Advertising,
AM.
ADVERTISING
FED’N,
http://www.aaf.org/default.asp?id=248 (last updated Sept. 2008); Peter J. Pitts,
Turning Point or Tipping Point: New FDA Draft Guidance and the Future of
DTC Advertising, HEALTH AFF., W4-259 (Apr. 28, 2004), http://content.health
affairs.org/content/suppl/2004/04/27/hlthaff.w4.259v1.DC1.
115. Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace:
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
429, 433 (1971); see also FDA Keeping Watch, supra note 114.
116. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420,
1456 (1999); but see Kathryn J. Aikin, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Prescription Drugs: Physician Survey Preliminary Results (2003),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/UCM148277.pd
f (reporting physician survey results that most doctors found that DTCA did
help educate consumers about their health problems).
117. Louis A. Morris & Lloyd G. Millstein, Drug Advertising to Consumers:
Effects of Formats for Magazine and Television Advertisements, 39 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 497, 500 (1984).
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Proponents also point out that advertising can lead to
lower drug prices.118 Even if advertising drives down its cost,
when a drug is unnecessary, that expenditure is wasteful.
Pharmaceutical companies are for-profit businesses; if
advertising actually led to overall reduced costs, or more
specifically, did not help increase their profits, they would
stop advertising. As many economists have noted, the “recent
growth in DTC advertising has persuaded consumers to
substitute new, more expensive drugs for older, lower-priced
ones”119 thereby increasing profits for industry.
2. First Amendment Limitations on Congressional
Power

04/16/2012 17:10:32

118. See Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15
J.L. & ECON. 337, 344–45 (1972) (noting that advertising correlates with lower
prices).
119. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 25 (citing Stephen Heffler et al.,
Health Spending Growth Up in 1999; Faster Growth Expected in The Future, 20
HEALTH AFF. 193 (2001)); see also Angell, Relationships, supra note 8
(explaining that DTCA promotes me-too drugs).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Brienne T. Greiner, Tough Pill to Swallow: Does
the First Amendment Prohibit WV from Regulating Pharmaceutical Companies’
Advertising Expenses to Lower the Cost of Prescription Drugs, 109 W. VA. L.
REV. 107, 120–21 (2006).
121. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
122. Greiner, supra note 120, at 123.
123. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
124. Id. at 818 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413
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Under the First Amendment, government may not
censor speech.120 The 1942 Supreme Court in Valentine v.
Chrestensen, however, held that the First Amendment
protections did not extend to “purely commercial
advertising.” 121 Commercial speech, along with obscenity,
fighting words, incitement, and defamation, remained
unprotected as a result of “low social value,” failure to
“contribute to the exchange of ideas and the search for truth,
and because the social interests in order and morality
outweigh any benefit that [it] produce[s].”122
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court narrowly
interpreted Valentine in Bigelow v. Virginia, revoking
commercial speech’s per se unprotected status. 123 Justice
Blackmun announced that “speech is not stripped of First
Amendment protection merely because it appears in [the]
form [of commercial advertisements].”124 The Court further
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emphasized the protection of commercial speech with respect
to prescription drugs in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.125 Writing for the
majority, Justice Blackmun stated that “even if the First
Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to
enlighten public decision making in a democracy, we could
not say that the free flow of information does not serve that
goal.”126 Accordingly, economic motives are irrelevant and
even “speech [that] does no more than propose a commercial
transaction” receives First Amendment protection.127
Simultaneously, the Court stressed that “[u]ntruthful speech,
commercial or otherwise, has never been protected.” 128
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, however, astutely predicted the
then-future problematic nature of DTCA that the majority
had not anticipated.129
In 1980, the Supreme Court provided a test to determine
whether the government can regulate a particular instance of
commercial speech.130 Specifically, the Central Hudson test
states that protected speech must: (1) “concern lawful
activity and not be misleading”; (2) concern a substantial
“asserted governmental interest”; (3) “directly advance[]
the governmental interest asserted”; and (4) “not [be]
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”131
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U.S. 376, 384 (1973); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)) (“The
fact that the particular advertisement . . . had commercial aspects or reflected
the advertiser’s commercial interests did not negate all First Amendment
guarantees.”).
125. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
126. Id. at 765.
127. Id. at 762 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385) (stating that “we
may assume that the advertiser’s interest is a purely economic one”).
128. Id. at 771.
129. Id. at 788 (“In the case of ‘our’ hypothetical pharmacist, he may now
presumably advertise not only the prices of prescription drugs, but may attempt
to energetically promote their sale so long as he does so truthfully. Quite
consistently with Virginia law requiring prescription drugs to be available only
through a physician, ‘our’ pharmacist might run any of the following
representative advertisements in a local newspaper: ‘Pain getting you down?
Insist that your physician prescribe Demerol. You pay a little more than for
aspirin, but you get a lot more relief’ ‘Can’t shake the flu? Get a prescription
for Tetracycline from your doctor today.’ ‘Don’t spend another sleepless night.
Ask your doctor to prescribe Seconal without delay.’ ” ).
130. Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
131. Id. at 566.
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132. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376–77 (2002); THAUL,
CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 15–16 & n.51.
133. Michelle M. Mello & Noah A. Messing, Restrictions on the Use of
Prescribing Data for Drug Promotion, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1248, 1248 (2011).
134. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–72 (2011).
135. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
136. Mello & Messing, supra note 133, at 1250 (“[T]he term ‘heightened
scrutiny’ is critical and pointedly ambiguous. It might be a mere synonym for
the midlevel scrutiny applied under the Central Hudson test — but it might
mean far more. In a prior opinion, Justice Kennedy cited First Amendment
cases that applied ‘strict scrutiny,’ the most rigorous kind, as examples of
‘heightened scrutiny,’ suggesting that he may have intended this meaning when
he used the same term in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. . . . Sorrell might thus
portend that commercial speech will no longer receive lesser protection than
political and social speech.” (internal citations omitted)).
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Applying that test, in Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center, the Court struck down a provision of the FDA
Modernization Act that required physicians and pharmacists
to refrain from advertising in order to compound a drug.132
The Supreme Court remains steadfast in holding drug
advertising constitutional and preventing states and
Congress from regulating its content. Most recently, in
Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Court struck down a Vermont law
restricting the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records
that reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors. In
enacting this law, “Vermont articulated three objectives:
avoiding harm to the public health associated with the
overprescription of new drugs, controlling costs by stemming
practices that promote expensive, branded drugs over
generics, and protecting physicians’ privacy.”133 The Court
found pharmaceutical data mining to be protected speech in
aid of pharmaceutical advertising.134 The statute at issue in
Sorrell imposed both content and speaker-based restrictions
by prohibiting the sale of physician prescribing patterns to
pharmaceutical manufacturers and detailers for marketing
purposes, but allowing the sale of the same records to certain
other entities. While the Court determined heightenedscrutiny to be the correct standard, it simultaneously held
that the statute failed even under the intermediate Central
Hudson test. In another decision only days later, however,
the Supreme Court held that all content-based restrictions
trigger strict scrutiny,135 thereby leaving the exact level of
scrutiny to be applied in future cases unclear.136
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In the wake of this ruling and as noted in Justice
Breyer’s dissent, the Court has opened the gates to the
possibility of striking down most FDA regulations since they
generally discriminate based on conduct and speaker.137 For
instance, off-label promotion by industry members, currently
prohibited by FDA regulations faced a First Amendment
challenge by Allergan several years ago. While Allergan
dropped the claim and that case ultimately settled,138 in light
of Sorrell’s application of heightened scrutiny to content- and
speaker-based regulations, the regulation would likely not
survive today. Thus, there are significant constitutional
concerns with strong content-based limitations on DTCA.139
II. DISCUSSION
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137. See Kevin Outterson, Higher First Amendment Hurdles for Public
Health Regulation, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. e13, e13(2) (2011); Sorrell, 131 S. Ct.
at 2676–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. Settlement Agreement between United States, et al. and Allergan, Inc. ¶
19 (Sept. 1, 2010); see also Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Allergan
Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $600 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label
Promotion of Botox, No. 10-988 (Sept. 1, 2010) available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-988.html.
139. See Sax, supra note 79, at 216 (advocating to institute the content-based
Truth in Marketing Act).
140. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
141. H.R. 2966, 111th Cong. (2009).
142. Lipinski Letter, supra note 15. But see Walker, supra note 6, at 1251–
52 (arguing that “the disallowance on ‘public policy’ grounds of deductions . . . is
best understood as a response to an appearance of subsidy” and noting that not
all deductions are actually subsidies).
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The problem with DTCA has “attracted enough
congressional attention to warrant at least six bills in the
110th Congress as well as concerns from members in the
111th.”140 Among these bills is the Say No to Drug Ads Act,
which aimed to alter the IRC such that “[n]o deduction shall
be allowed . . . for any amount paid or incurred for a direct-toconsumer advertisement of a prescription drug.”141 Part II
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of this particular
strategy concerning DTCA.
As Representative Daniel Lipinski, sponsor of one of the
bills to revoke the DTCA tax deduction, said, “I am not
looking to infringe upon any company’s right to advertise,
only to help assure that the American taxpayers are not
subsidizing these industries in our health care system.”142 By
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allowing a tax deduction for DTCA, the government is
reducing the cost of advertising and encouraging DTCA
spending.143 “[The pharmaceutical companies] already have
plenty of incentives to spend that money . . . . As Congress
looks for ways to repair our health care system, this is one
simple reform that ought not to be overlooked.”144
Increasing the financial burden on industry marketing
may reduce the frequency and enhance the accuracy of DTCA
content since there will be a greater monetary loss
to companies when they are forced to cease broadcasting a misleading ad. 145 The recent Pfizer marketing
abuse resulting in a multibillion-dollar fine further supports
the need to encourage accurate advertising from the outset.146
Moreover, eliminating the DTCA tax deduction would not
prevent the pharmaceutical industry, ranked by Fortune
magazine as one of the top thirty most profitable industries in 2009,147 from advertising.148 Thus, any benefits from
advertising would be maintained while decreasing negative
effects.
Removing the tax deduction would not cease all DTCA by
creating a practical barrier. Rather, the removal would serve
three main purposes. First, it would signal Congressional
unwillingness to subsidize DTCA through the Tax Code.
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143. See Walker, supra note 6, at 1251–52 (arguing that “the disallowance on
‘public policy’ grounds of deductions . . . is best understood as a response to an
appearance of subsidy” and noting that not all deductions are actually
subsidies).
144. Lipinski Introduces Bill to End Tax Break for Marketing and
Advertising By Drug Companies, CONGRESSMAN DAN LIPINSKI (June 17, 2009),
http://web.archive.org/web/20110406164620/http://www.lipinski.house.gov/index
.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=917&Itemid=9 (internal quotations
omitted).
145. Cf. The distortions to the healthcare market as a result of insurance
such that consumers do not fully appreciate the cost of their decisions.
146. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/09/03/business/03health.html; see also Kesselheim, supra note 98, at 1486.
147. Global 500 2009: Top Performers — Fast Growing Industries: Growth in
Revenues, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009
/performers/industries/fastgrowers/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2011) (ranking the
pharmaceutical industry number six in growth in profits and number twentyseven in growth in revenue).
148. See, e.g., Lipinski Letter, supra note 15 (explaining that pharmaceutical
companies earn approximately $4.20 for each dollar spent on advertising and
“neither need nor deserve to have their marketing expenditures subsidized by
taxpayers”).
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Second, making advertising more expensive would alter the
drug companies’ cost-benefit analysis as to how much money
to spend on DTCA, likely leading them to cut back and reduce
the overall quantity of DTCA. Third, the removal of the
deductions may find favor with the public by resulting in
increased revenue of approximately $37 billion over ten
years.149
A. Revocation of Tax Deductions is Constitutional
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149. Rich Thomaselli, Industry Mobilizes to Fight Off Congress’ $37 Billion
Ad Tax, ADVERTISING AGE (June 22, 2009), http://adage.com/article/news/bigpharma-media-cos-4a-s-defend-threat-dtc/137476/.
150. Outterson, supra note 137, at e13(1).
151. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388–89 (1992)).
152. Id. at 2663 (“Vermont’s law . . . has the effect of preventing detailers—
and only detailers—from communicating with physicians in an effective and
informative manner.”).
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Even in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Sorrell, which “expand[ed] the First Amendment’s reach
and power to strike down government regulation of health
care information[,]”150 revocation of the deductions for DTCA
remains constitutionally viable. As Justice Kennedy noted in
writing for the majority, Sorrell did not alter the proposition
that “a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one
industry but not in others, because the risk of fraud . . . is in
its view greater there.” 151 Rather, the Court focused on
content- and speaker-based restrictions in access to or use
of information. Unlike the Vermont statute in Sorrell, 152
revocation of the deductions for DTCA does not impose a
content- or viewpoint-based restriction since it neither affects
the industry’s use of, or access to, information nor pertains to
the content of its advertisements. Drug manufacturers can
still publish the exact same advertisements that could be
published with a deduction. Conversely, imposing a direct
regulation on truthful, non-misleading DTCA would not likely
survive a First Amendment challenge.
Revoking the deductions also does not impose speakerbased discrimination since it would apply to all DTCA,
regardless of the person or entity engaging in the practice or
his motivation. While the revocation may have the effect of
discriminating based on speaker since only pharmaceutical
manufacturers engage in DTCA, the revocation does not
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involve the facial discrimination apparent in the Vermont
statute.
Another reason to differentiate DTCA from the data
mining at issue in Sorrell is that data mining provides
useful, educational information to doctors.153 While DTCA
also purports to educate, it targets consumers whose
protection presents a greater concern to the court. As Kevin
Outterson explained in his recent article in the New England
Journal of Medicine, the Sorrell Court also indicated that the
constitutional standard applied to regulations aimed at
protecting consumers might be more relaxed.154 According to
Outterson, this means that:
FDA regulation of [DTCA] could be given more leeway
than marketing to physicians, especially if medical
education programs focused on helping physicians
evaluate such claims. Similarly, more leeway could be
given under special circumstances, such as if the FDA
restricted [DTCA] as part of a Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategy.155
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153. Id. at 2683 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Mello & Messing, supra note 133, at
1251.
154. Outterson, supra note 137, at e13(2) (“The First Amendment directs us
to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good . . . . These precepts apply
with full force when the audience, in this case prescribing physicians, consists of
‘sophisticated and experienced’ consumers.” (quoting Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at
2671)).
155. Id.
156. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596 (1983).
157. Brief for Appellee at 28, Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 99-5097), 1999 WL 34835366 (citing Regan v. Taxation
With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545–46 (1983); Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)) (discussing tax deduction and
exceptions). Also consider, Congress’ removal of lobbying, a protected speech,
from the class of deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses under
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While Congress cannot limit protected speech, they are
not required to ease its financial burden. In Bob Jones
University v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that
“[i]n an area as complex as the tax system, the agency
Congress vests with administrative responsibility must be
able to exercise its authority to meet changing conditions and
new problems.”156 It is “well established that Congress is not
required to subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights
through the allowance of tax deductions, and may withdraw
such subsidies if it chooses to do so.”157 Tax deductions are
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matters of legislative grace158 and Congress “[u]nquestionably
. . . has the power to condition, limit, or deny deductions.”159
For instance, the IRC specifically exempts deductions for
certain political expenditures, despite First Amendment
implications.160 This section also differentiates between local
and non-local legislation. Note, however, that Congress
would not be permitted to revoke deductions only for a
particular political party. Such a restriction would be an
impermissible speaker- and content-based restriction under
Sorrell. 161 The IRC also excludes deductions for expenses
related to a redemption, certain passive real estate
investments, net capital losses in excess of three thousand
dollars, certain group health plans, and stock reacquisition, to
name just a few.162 Most importantly, Congress has exempted
certain foreign advertising expenses from the category of
deductible expenses.163 In Bob Jones University, the Supreme
Court held that Congress had the power to revoke tax
deductions on the basis of racial discrimination.164
The Supreme Court, however, has held that preventing
companies from spending money on protected speech violates
the First Amendment.165 In First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, the Court struck down a Massachusetts state law
criminalizing contributions or expenditures by certain
corporations for the purpose of influencing a vote. 166 The
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the IRC remains constitutional in the wake of the Bellotti decision. I.R.C. §
162(e) (2006); see also First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784
(1978).
158. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2006); Bob Jones Univ., 461 at 574 (approving
removal of tax exempt status); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435,
440 (1934); Knight v. Commissioner, 552 U.S. 181, 192 (2008) (“noting the
familiar rule that an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace”
(citing INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (internal
quotations omitted)).
159. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934).
160. I.R.C. § 162(e).
161. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (finding that the
Vermont Law violates the First Amendment since “[t]he State’s interest in
burdening the speech of detailers . . . turns on nothing more than a difference of
opinion”).
162. I.R.C. § 162(k), (l).
163. I.R.C. § 162(j).
164. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585 (1983); see also
Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943).
165. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978).
166. Id. at 765. The Court also explained that the lower court erred in
holding that “First Amendment rights of a corporation are limited to issues that
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materially affect is [sic] business, property, or assets.” Id. at 767. Even if the
protections were limited to this subset, pharmaceutical advertising would still
be allowed. This Article, however, discusses this case to emphasize that the
amount of money a corporation may spend on advertising cannot be restricted.
167. Id. at 766.
168. Id. at 765–66.
169. Id. at 783.
170. Id. at 784–85.
171. Gregg D. Polsky & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Regulating Section 527
Organizations, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1000, 1002 (2005) (discussing McConnell
v. FEC).
172. Professor Briffault is the Vice Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain
Professor of Legislation at Columbia Law School.
173. Polsky & Charles, supra note 171, at 1002 n.19 (citing Richard Briffault,
McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance Law, 3
ELECTION L.J. 147, 148 (2004)).
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Bellotti Court stressed the importance of the “exacting
scrutiny” applied to “legislative prohibition[s] . . . directed at
speech itself and speech on a public issue” since the
First Amendment protects speech regardless of the source.167
Indeed, the Supreme Court drew particular attention
to advertising, reaffirming its holding in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy.168 Specifically, the Court noted that “[a]
commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected . . .
because it furthers the societal interest in the ‘free flow of
commercial information.’ ” 169 Congress has no authority to
While the removal of the tax
limit protected speech. 170
deductions may increase the cost of advertising and thereby
reduce its prevalence, it does not prevent manufacturers from
spending money to exercise their First Amendment right.
Recently, the Supreme Court issued a decision
“reflect[ing] its willingness to expand significantly the
justifications for regulating campaign financing, the
First Amendment notwithstanding.”171 Professor Richard
Briffault 172 observed that the Court reframed the issue of
regulating the finances away from “a threat to freedoms of
speech and association and therefore a challenge to
constitutional values . . . [instead] giv[ing] great weight to the
interests in fair, informed democratic decision-making it
found to be advanced[.]” 173 This reasoning for increasing
regulations should similarly apply to DTCA. Rather than
promote, DTCA, facilitated by tax deductions, hinders the
free flow of information. DTCA influences consumers to
pressure their over-burdened doctor whose reasoning cannot
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compete with the alluring ads to prescribe a more expensive
medicine.174
B. Policy
1. Negative Effects of DTCA
In their comments on the 2004 FDA DTCA draft
guidance, FTC noted “the important role that DTC
advertising can play in keeping consumers betterinformed about their healthcare and treatment options.”175
FTC highlighted the importance of providing consumers with
risk information they can easily understand and “improv[ing]
the facilitation of truthful, non-misleading information.” 176
Thus, FTC implicitly recognizes that DTCA, in its current
state, fails to promote public welfare as demonstrated by the
industry’s repeated violations of FDA guidance.177
Improving consumer knowledge by providing information
through DTCA is an honorable, yet impractical, aspiration.
Drug companies often provide technically accurate
information framed to mislead viewers.178 The general public
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174. See, e.g., Patrick Cohoon, An Answer to the Question Why the Time Has
Come to Abrogate the Learned Intermediary Rule in the Case of Direct-toConsumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 1333, 1357
(2001) (“There is no justification for concluding that DTC advertising does not
interfere with the doctor-patient relationship.”); Terzian, supra note 3, at 158
(“Moreover, industry critics of DTC advertisements argue that the
advertisements distort doctor-patient relationships and may actually increase
the use of prescription drugs.”); David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct to
Consumer Drug Advertising, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 259, 284 (2007) (stating that
“doctors often succumb to patient pressure, or patients ‘doctor-shop’ until they
find a doctor willing to write the prescription the patient wants” and that
“[m]edical organizations generally see DTC ads as a threat to the doctor-patient
relationship for just that reason”).
175. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., BUREAU OF ECON. & OFFICE OF POLICY
PLANNING OF THE FTC, DOCKET NO. 2004D-0042, IN THE MATTER OF REQUEST
FOR COMMENTS ON AGENCY DRAFT GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS REGARDING
CONSUMER-DIRECTED PROMOTION 13 (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
2004/05/040512dtcdrugscomment.pdf (emphasis added).
176. Id.
177. See sources cited supra notes 11, 73, 83, 146.
178. See, e.g., Lipinski Letter, supra note 15 (“In health care reform we
should be striving to provide consumers with more information, but this
information should be unbiased information that gives a clear understanding of
the choices available to them.”); see also Terzian, supra note 3, at 165
(explaining that “even though DTC advertisements may be technically truthful,
these advertisements mislead consumers because consumers lack the
specialized knowledge needed to evaluate the information effectively”);
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Lenhardt, Why So Glum?, supra note 92, at 167–68.
179. See Davis, supra note 40, at 863–64.
180. KATHRYN J. AIKIN ET AL., PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN ATTITUDES AND
BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH DTC PROMOTION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
SUMMARY OF FDA SURVEY RESEARCH RESULTS 8 (2004), cited in Vladeck, supra
note 174.
181. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 26. Cf. DTC Prescription Drug
Advertising, supra note 114.
182. Susan Heylman, Widely Advertised ‘Restless Legs’ Drugs Move into
Court, 44 TRIAL 14, 14, 16 (2008) (explaining disease mongering and that while
Consumer Reports, for example, has identified restless leg syndrome as an
example of disease mongering, it is a real disease according to the National
Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke); see also Moynihan et al., Selling
Sickness, supra note 4, at 886.
183. Ray Moynihan & David Henry, The Fight Against Disease Mongering:
Generating Knowledge for Action, Public Library of Science, 3 PUB. LIBR. SCI.
MED. e191, e191 (2006), available at http://collections.plos.org/plosmedicine/pdf/
plme-03-04-diseasemongering.pdf.
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with no medical training cannot fully appreciate the
implications of a particular drug as presented by the
pharmaceutical companies.179 An FDA survey revealed that
75% of patients overestimate drug’s efficacy based on
DTCA. 180 Many viewers assume that advertisements are
preapproved and all advertised drugs are “completely safe.”181
DTCA generally does not list alternate treatment options or
include the full list of potential side effects and consumers
typically lack the independent knowledge to appreciate an ad
in its proper context.
Despite the instruction to viewers in every broadcast ad
to consult additional sources for the full list of side effects,
consumers are unlikely to comply. Rather than rationally
process the information that should be relevant, consumers
respond to the images designed to evoke a positive association
in the consumer’s mind. Alternatively, the ads sometimes
aim to incite fear in the viewer to make the viewer believe
that a relatively minor problem is a serious problem requiring
immediate attention. Regardless of the marketing strategy,
DTCA consistently emphasizes the drug’s benefits to
outweigh the side effects.
Accordingly, some argue that DTCA creates a “disease
mongering” problem whereby patients decide they have the
problem mentioned in an ad (e.g. restless leg syndrome) and
request the miracle cure from their doctor.182 This increases
prescription drug use, and consequently, the cost of health
care, but does not lead to a healthier population.183 When
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doctors inappropriately prescribe medication, drug companies
are shielded from blame by claiming the prescribing
physician as a “learned intermediary” with the “ultimate
responsibility for prescribing drugs.”184
While “many physicians believe that educated patients
are easier to treat and care for,” few “believe that DTC
advertisements are educationally effective.”185 Rather than
promoting productive communications between doctors and
patients, DTCA “create[s] unreasonable or inappropriate
patient expectations for product effectiveness and often lead
patients to request inappropriate products for their medical
needs.”186 “Physicians may relent to patient pressure, even if
it is not in the [patient’s] best interest.”187 One survey found
that physicians prescribe the advertised and requested drug
39% of the time despite not “believ[ing it is] the
best medical—or economic—option.”188 In many cases, the
providers felt another drug would have been equally effective,
and in some cases, the physicians even stated that they
believed that a different course of action would have been
more beneficial.189 For instance, doctors frequently prescribed
the heavily-advertised Claritin despite it working only 11%
better than a placebo and the existence of other more effective
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184. Joel S. Weissman et al., Physicians Report on Patient Encounters
Involving Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, HEALTH AFF., W4-226 (Apr. 28, 2004),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/04/28/hlthaff.w4.219.short);
Pines, DTC History, supra note 37, at 515; Terzian, supra note 3, at 161 (“The
learned intermediary doctrine holds that an adequate warning by a prescribing
physician discharges a manufacturer’s duty to warn.”) However, as seen in
Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals, the doctrine does not shield manufacturers
from potential liability when the FDA mandates a direct warning to patients.
Terzian, supra note 3, at 162.
185. Terzian, supra note 3, at 158.
186. Id.; see also Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass’n,
Direct-to-Consumer Advertisements of Prescription Drugs, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
119, 122–23 (2000) (noting that the American Medical Association believes that
DTCA causes a time burden on physicians).
187. Terzian, supra note 3, at 157; see also Angell, Relationships, supra note
8 (explaining that doctors may go along with prescribing the requested medicine
since it is easier than suggesting an alternate course of treatment).
188. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 24.
189. Id. (citing Joel S. Weissman et al., Physicians Report on Patient
Encounters Involving Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, HEALTH AFF., W4-226
(Apr. 28, 2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/04/28/
hlthaff.w4.219.short); see also Angell, Relationships, supra note 8 (explaining
that “adverts are mostly for me-too drugs and are designed to convince viewers
that one is better than another, despite the fact that these drugs are seldom
compared in clinical trials at equivalent doses”).
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medications. 190 In the event that the doctor refuses to
prescribe the drug, the patient may just doctor-shop until he
finds one who will comply with his demand. Refusal to
prescribe may also generate tension between the doctor and
the patient, who does not understand the rationale, thereby
placing a strain on the doctor-patient relationship in which
trust and honesty are critical. 191 Thus, industry “may be
creating demand where there is no need and thereby harming
the doctor-patient relationship.”192
The FDA’s use of the same regulatory standard for
DTCA and physician advertising also presents a problem.193
Doctors, by virtue of their basic professional requirements,
may consider drug advertising in context and better
comprehend risk information and research further.194 As a
third party, the physician will not experience the same
emotional response as the patient. Despite the continuing
medical education requirements, keeping up with the latest
advances in the ever-evolving medical field presents a
challenge for doctors. Thus, drug detailing alerting doctors to
a new treatment option may serve as a useful additional
means of keeping doctors current. 195 DTCA, on the other
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190. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 25.
191. Terzian, supra note 3, at 157.
192. Id. at 165.
193. But see Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 350 (arguing that
“[b]ecause DTC marketing of prescription drugs has not fundamentally altered
the playing field, traditional rules of law should remain fully viable”).
194. But see Lenhardt, Why So Glum?, supra note 92, at 166 (arguing that
doctors are sometimes unknowingly deceived by DTCA).
Additionally,
physicians are human and some are persuaded by the perks offered by the drug
companies, and some are unavoidably influenced by the inundation of the
pharmaceutical representatives who flood their offices, a practice known as
detailing. Accordingly, there is currently a rising concern with detailing and an
increased focus on attempting to institute academic detailing which involves
unbiased sources providing doctors with summaries of the best treatments with
a focus on quality and a consideration of costs. For a more detailed discussion,
please see Mark Navin, Program to Inform Doctors about Drugs at Risk, RADIO
BOSTON (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.radioboston.org/2010/01/08/program-toinform-doctors-about-drugs-at-risk/.
195. Advertising to physicians is still problematic and academic detailing
should be implemented to replace pharmaceutical advertising to physicians.
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (explaining
detailing as a process through which pharmaceutical salespersons, generally
armed with background information on the physician’s prescribing patterns, to
persuade the physician to prescribe a particular drug). “Detailers bring drug
samples as well as medical studies that explain the ‘details’ and potential
advantages of various prescription drugs. Interested physicians listen, ask
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questions, and receive follow-up [sic] data.” Id.
196. Terzian, supra note 3, at 165.
197. S. 301, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3138, 111th Cong. (2009).
198. See generally John A. Rizzo, Advertising and Competition in the Ethical
Pharmaceutical Industry: The Case of Antihypertensive Drugs, 42 J.L. & ECON.
89, 89–91 (1999) (primary effect of advertising drugs is to reduce consumer price
sensitivity).
199. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 1.
200. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim et. al., Extensions of Intellectual Property
Rights and Delayed Adoption of Generic Drugs: Effects on Medicaid Spending,
25 HEALTH AFF. 1637, 1638 (2006) (explaining the pharmaceutical
manufacturers’ practice of using various tactics to extend the life of their
existing “blockbuster” drugs known as “evergreening”).
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hand, targets patients who lack the specialized knowledge to
comprehend and appropriately weigh a drug’s risks and
benefits.196
Yet, currently the government appears more focused on
the undue influence of the industry on doctors rather
than consumers. Recently, Congress enacted the Physician
Payment Sunshine Act, which requires, among other things,
drug companies to disclose gifts and payments to doctors,
as Congress believes they generate conflicts of interest
and biases. 197 While industry influence over the medical
profession presents legitimate concerns, it should not be the
sole legislative focus.
DTCA also results in increased healthcare spending since
only the brand drugs advertise and the adverting
reduces consumer price sensitivity.198 Even when a consumer
requests and receives a medically necessary drug as a result
of DTCA, the ad often leads to wasteful spending by
convincing patients they need the brand name drug, when a
cheaper generic would be equally effective.199 This effect is
magnified by the fact that most consumers have health
insurance and thus do not absorb the full cost of the drug.
Accordingly, the irrational preference for brand over generic
drug is another way in which DTCA increases unnecessary
healthcare spending.
Allowing an advertising tax deduction also incentivizes
the industry to invest additional resources in advertising to
increase the life and profitability of their existing drugs
rather than invest in research and development for new
drugs.200 The patent system already provides drug companies
with incentives to create drugs by allowing exclusivity periods
for the first drug manufacturer to get a New Drug Application
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and the first generic drug to get an Abbreviated New Drug
Application. Accordingly, these exclusivity periods, put in
place to encourage research and development, allow the
industry to profit from the drugs they make. Yet incentives
are misaligned when more money is spent on administrative
costs than research and development. Thus, removing the
tax deduction may help shift the incentives from encouraging
companies to invest in prolonging the profitability of existing
drugs to investing the money into new drugs.201
2. Lobbying

04/16/2012 17:10:32

201. Terzian, supra note 3, at 165 (stating that critics of DTCA “argue that
the money spent on expensive television advertising could be better spent on
research and development of products, or to reduce the price of pharmaceutical
products, thereby promotion public health and welfare”).
202. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 495. For a discussion of the
definition of lobbying in the tax context and exactly what is and is not included,
see generally id. at 508–18.
203. See id. at 492.
204. Id. at 492–96, 507–08, 517–18.
205. Cf. id. at 492–96.
206. See id. at 498 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-1447, at 17 (1962)).
207. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 498 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 87-1447, at
17; S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 24 (1962)). They also noted that this “would reduce
the administrative burden.” Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 498. But see
infra Part II.D (discussing how removing tax deductions does not necessarily
substantially increase administrative burdens).
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Unlike DTCA, Congress specifically exempts most
lobbying from the deductible category of “ordinary and
necessary business expenses.”202 Like advertising, the First
Amendment and several Supreme Court decisions limit
Congress’ ability to regulate lobbying. 203 Nevertheless,
Congress removed the tax deductions for lobbying as a means
of regulating and limiting the activity to “reduc[e the]
possible nefarious effects.”204 The line of reasoning applied by
Congress to the allowance and removal of the deductions for
lobbying expenses, and grassroots lobbying specifically, also
applies to DTCA.205
Originally, Congress recognized lobbying expenses as
included within the IRC’s definition of ordinary and
necessary business expenses and permitted their deduction.206
Like advertising, Congress observed that permitting the
deduction for lobbying “would improve the flow of
information.”207 In spite of that belief, Congress did not find
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value in extending deductibility to grassroots lobbying that
targets the public to assist with lobbying activities.208 That
distinction implicitly recognized the susceptibility of the
general public to persuasion on topics about which they likely
have little base knowledge. If Congress, however, attempted
to distinguish between deductible and non-deductible
lobbying based on the identity of the speaker or the content of
the lobbying, that would violate the First Amendment under
Sorrell.209
Additionally, Congress did not extend the revocation of
the deductibility of lobbying expenses to charities,
distinguishing between those who stand to profit from their
efforts and those who do not.210 This reflects Congress’
concern for both influence over the public and the actors’
motivation in attempting to influence.
Despite the
importance of prescription drugs, the pharmaceutical
industry is not in the same class as charities. Thus, the
DTCA tax deductions could similarly be revoked.211
C.

Increased FDA Regulations as an Alternative Solution

04/16/2012 17:10:32

208. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 498–99.
209. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–72 (2011).
210. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 517 (“Congress felt that charities
were more likely to exercise their influence in a positive way, particularly with
respect to providing information to government actors and to the public.”); see
also I.R.C. § 162(e)(3) (2006).
211. For example, the potential for disease mongering and the potential
negative impact on the doctor-patient relationship. See Moynihan & Henry,
supra note 183, at e191; Terzian, supra note 3, at 158.
212. See, e.g., ANGELL, THE TRUTH, supra note 9, at 124 (“Obviously, given
the nature of the ads we’re subjected to, the [FDA] fails at [its] job.”).
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The FDA, the agency in charge of regulating DTCA under
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, should be the
appropriate agency to implement changes to the current
system and solve the DTCA problem. If indeed DTCA is
misleading or not truthful, then the FDA has ample
constitutional room to regulate it. FDA, however, has failed
to rise to the challenge of sufficiently regulating DTCA and
has left legislators concerned with current DTCA practices
and searching for a solution.212 This failure stems from two
major roadblocks: 1) the FDA lacks the necessary funding and
resources; and 2) the FDA would have difficulty specifically
identifying non-truthful or misleading speech, and therefore
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would face practical difficulties in constitutionally increasing
DTCA content regulation. FDA requires an average of fortyfive days to review ads once they air.213 A 2006 Government
Accounting Office (GAO) report indicated that sometimes by
the time FDA issues a warning on a misleading ad, its
publication has already concluded.214 Even when the FDA
condemns an ad and the company ceases publication of the
misleading ad, during the lag time inevitably some viewers
saw the original advertisement and will either not see or
disregard, the corrected version. 215 Further, in a 2009
Congressional Research Service report, the problem was
recognized specifically in an area in which the FDA already
has authority, but has failed to utilize.216 The FDA lacks the
manpower to review every advertisement prior to public
viewing or to create a user fee program.217 FDA staffing has
not kept pace with the increase in number of drugs or
advertisements. 218 As a result, in 2004, the FDA only
reviewed approximately 32% of advertisements submitted
before airing.219
Following the passing of the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), on March
14, 2007, then FDA Commissioner Andrew C. von
Eschenbach issued a statement including a discussion of “a
new program to assess fees for advisory reviews of DTC
television advertisements.” 220 In addressing the concerns
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 108 Side A
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213. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 13.
214. Schwartz, Viability, supra note 36, at 348.
215. Tim Kelly & John Busbice, Measuring the Effectiveness of DTC
Advertising, 18 PRODUCT MGMT. TODAY 20, 21 (2007) (“TV advertising drives a
sharp increase in new therapy starts for the first week or two after exposure
and a more gradual increase in cumulative total prescriptions through week
36.”).
216. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 27–29.
217. Cf. 21 U.S.C.A. § 353b (West 2010) (“The Secretary may require the
submission of any television advertisement for a drug.”) (emphasis added).
218. See Donohue, A Decade of DTCA, supra note 74, at 679 (“[T]he number
of staff members who are dedicated to reviewing advertisements has remained
relatively stable, whereas the use of such advertising has grown substantially.
In 2002, three FDA staff members were dedicated to reviewing direct-toconsumer advertisements.
In 2004, four staffers were reviewing such
advertisements, even though spending on this form of advertising (and probably
the volume of ads to review) had increased by 45%, from $2.9 billion to $4.2
billion.”).
219. Id.
220. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 110th
Cong. 7 (2007) [hereinafter Eschenbach statement] (statement of Andrew C. von
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Eschenbach, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin.).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 8.
223. Id.
224. User Fee Program for Advisory Review of Direct-to-Consumer Television
Advertisements for Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Program Will
Not Be Implemented, 73 Fed. Reg. 2924 (Jan. 16, 2008).
225. Id.
226. Eschenbach statement, supra note 220, at 7 (“As a result, it is
impossible for FDA to review all of the DTC television advertisement advisory
submissions it receives in a timely manner.”).
227. User Fee Program for Advisory Review of Direct-to-Consumer Television
Advertisements for Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Program Will
Not Be Implemented, 73 Fed. Reg. at 2924.
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regarding the imbalance of risk and benefit information
provided in DTCA, companies’ ability to submit ads for
review, and the industry’s awareness of the benefits of the
optional review, von Eschenbach also noted the FDA’s
increasing workload and the lack of a corresponding increase
in staff.221 As a solution, von Eschenbach proposed
instituting a program where companies volunteering to have
their ads reviewed by FDA would pay a user fee which would
be used to “increase[] FDA resources to allow for . . . timely
review . . . and ensure FDA input[.]”222 FDA anticipated that
these fees would generate several million in revenue and
enable them to hire twenty-seven new employees to review
ads.223 Under this arrangement, companies could get FDA
approval prior to broadcasting their ads and thus not risk
enforcement action against them.
On January 3, 2008, however, the Federal Register
printed a notice that the “User Fee Program for Advisory
Review of Direct-to-Consumer Television Advertisements for
Prescription Drug and Biological Products; Program Will Not
Be Implemented[.]”224 As a result, the FDA concluded that in
lieu of a user fee, “[a]dvertisements voluntarily submitted for
FDA review will be reviewed in as timely a manner as
resources permit.”225 Since the FDA by its own admission is
incapable of reviewing the ads in a timely manner, few
companies are likely to voluntarily submit ads.226
This failure of the law may not be quite as large a
deficiency as it appears. First, the proposal was merely
voluntary and thus would not solve the compliance
problem.227 Second, the program would require significant
resources to merely obtain a non-legally-binding FDA
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228. See id.
229. Margaret A. Hamburg, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drugs Admin., Remarks on
“Effective Enforcement and Benefits to Public Health” at Food and Drug Law
Institute (Aug. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Hamburg, Remarks], available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm175983.htm.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Pettypiece, supra note 54 (“As a result, the agency issued 41 warning
letters to drug makers, or almost double the number in 2008.”).
233. FDA expanded authority by the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 and Food and
Drug Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007.
234. Pettypiece, supra note 54.
235. Id. (noting the decrease in advertising spending and that “the recession
has been partly to blame”).
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recommendation. Third, not even the FDA believed that the
program would have received the $11 million necessary to
make the undertaking worthwhile.228 Finally, the FDA would
also face First Amendment limits, as noted above, on its
ability to regulate the content of the ads.
In an August 6, 2009 speech, FDA Commissioner
Margaret Hamburg acknowledged a “steep decline in the
FDA’s enforcement activity over the past several years.”229
Not surprisingly, the violations which “have gone
unaddressed for far too long” include misleading
advertising. 230 As Hamburg noted, “[t]hese delays do not
result from a lack of commitment by FDA career staff.”231
FDA has recently demonstrated its promised commitment to
enforcement of existing regulations by issuing more warning
letters.232 These efforts and good intentions, however, are
insufficient. In light of its increased authority in recent
years, the overburdened-FDA simply does not possess the
means or funds to increase its enforcement power in order to
make a substantial impact on the current situation.233
According to a January 2010 article, Thomas Abrams,
Director of the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising and
Communications, reported that “[o]ver the last five years, the
[FDA] has increased the number of people monitoring ads by
50% to 60% in an effort to keep” pace with advertising.234
Some may argue that the 4.7% decrease of DTCA in the first
three quarters of 2009, compared to the previous year,
indicates the FDA’s increased enforcement is already helping
reduce the frequency of DTCA. The trend, however, can more
likely be attributed to the current financial crisis and
companies’ reluctance to spend money.235
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Thus, there are problems with various aspects of the
current DTCA regulation, which either cannot or will not be
remedied by FDA action. Practical constraints prevent the
FDA from serving as a realistic, practical, or sufficient
solution to the DTCA problem. Any change to the FDA’s
responsibility would not only increase their responsibility, but
also decrease available funds and resources for other
programs.
Moreover, constitutional concerns frustrate
attempts to strengthen FDA regulation of DTCA content.
D. Disincentivizing DTCA Through the IRC Would Not
Cause an Administrative Burden

04/16/2012 17:10:32

236. See Lipinski Letter, supra note 15 (“Each year pharmaceutical
companies spend nearly $18 billion for advertising, marketing, and promotion of
prescription drugs, and the tax deduction these companies receive amounts to
$6.3 billion a year according to the Congressional Research Service.”).
237. See, e.g., Weisbach & Nussim, Tax and Spending, supra note 20, at 958;
Walker, supra note 6, at 1259–60 (explaining that under Eric Zolt’s analysis of
tax penalties, the low administrative costs “offset the crudeness of the
incentives provided”).
238. See I.R.C. § 162 (2006) (allowing a deduction for advertising in some
instances, such as DTCA, but not allowing certain other instances, including
certain foreign advertising).
239. Walker, supra note 6 (including several examples of tax disincentives
and stating that the effect of these “provisions is to raise the effective cost of—
and to discourage—the disfavored activity”); see also I.R.C. § 162.
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Instituting an ex-ante user fee imposed through the FDA
would accomplish the same goals, but would increase the
FDA’s work and responsibilities. Conversely, removing the
tax deductions would not entail increasing the IRS’ budget,
resources, or responsibility, but would still raise revenue.236
As some scholars have pointed out, a benefit of instituting a
disincentive through tax penalties in the IRC is low
administrative cost.237 The taxable status of advertising is
already at issue in the IRC and this approach is clearly
feasible since its treatment varies among of different types of
Also, for the targeted companies, the
advertising. 238
complexity will be small, especially considering the billions to
be received. As a result of the low administrative cost, the
IRC “includes numerous provisions that discourage particular
non-tax behaviors.” 239 For instance, IRC section 162(m)
imposes a tax penalty on certain executive salaries instead of
having another agency directly regulate.
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For this reason, the removal of the deductions for DTCA
has been widely supported as demonstrated by the proposed
legislation and arguments from scholars. For instance, the
2009 CRS Report suggested removing the tax deduction for
advertising as a means of “[m]ak[ing] DTC Advertising [l]ess
[p]rofitable to [i]ndustry” which would thereby reduce the
overall level of DTC.240 As one scholar argues, the Tax Code
serves as a logical first place for Congress to attempt to
regulate lobbying since it “requires spending money, and
when money is spent, there is always the question of how to
treat those expenditures for tax purposes.”241 Alternatively,
“[p]utting a program into the tax system makes the tax
system look more complicated, but there is unseen
simplification elsewhere.”242 Moreover, the imposition of a
monetary disincentive does not require any specialized
knowledge. 243 Thus, as a result of the faulty information
portrayed in DTCA, the First Amendment hindering practical
regulation of DTCA, and the FDA’s limited resources,
taxation remains one policy mechanism constitutionally
available to Congress to remedy the negative effects of DTCA.
E.

Potential Problems

04/16/2012 17:10:32

240. THAUL, CRS REPORT, supra note 12, at 32–33.
241. Mayer, Lobbying, supra note 28, at 494.
242. Weisbach & Nussim, Tax and Spending, supra note 20, at 958.
243. See id. at 958–59. Authors explained that where specialization is not
required for a particular task, there may be benefits to coordinating certain
activities. Id. Accordingly, this would be an appropriate instance to use the
Tax Code, which is already being used rather than to start trying to find
another way to achieve the same result. Id.
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As with every piece of legislation, removing the tax
deductions for DTCA presents several concerns. It is possible
that even if DTCA becomes more expensive, the industry will
not shift its spending to research and development. Rather,
the drug companies could respond by shifting the spending to
other promotional activities such as drug detailing, health
outreach fairs, or grants to patient advocacy groups. The
wealth of alternatives might strengthen the argument that
the change in the Tax Code did not impermissibly constrain
speech, since the companies retain many other ways to
disseminate their messages. Indeed, the DTCA channel itself
remains fully legal, with only the public subsidy removed.
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Of course, if the industry reacted by increasing total drug
advertising, some of the congressional policy objectives would
not be met. While predicting the industry’s next move if
Congress eliminates the tax deduction presents a challenge,244
whether the policy achieves its goals will be an empirical
question.
Additionally, the removal of the deductions for DTCA
may either disproportionately impact different companies for
the same conduct 245 and may result in over deterrence of
DTCA. Denying deductions is not intended to cease DTCA,
but rather to remove the public subsidy. Proponents’
arguments include some justifications for the practice that, if
true, provide compelling reasons to ensure its continued
existence. Accordingly, while the removal of deductions
would probably not lead to complete deterrence246 this Article
argues that some measure of deterrence through the IRC is
the appropriate means to deter. Thus, in the alternative to
the removal of the deductions, Congress should institute a
cap on the amount which may be deducted for DTCA, just as
they have done for certain executive compensation, to reduce
spending.247
CONCLUSION
In the face of compelling public policy justifications, as
judged by Congress, the Tax Code could be revised to deny
tax deductions for DTCA. The removal of this public subsidy
31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 110 Side B
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244. See Donohue, A Decade of DTCA, supra note 74, at 677–78 (“Driven by
increases in direct-to-consumer advertising, total promotion as a percentage of
sales has increased substantially during the past 5 years, leading some
observers to worry that consumers must bear these increased costs in the form
of higher prices. Economic theory and evidence suggest that changes in
marketing costs are unlikely to have a direct effect on pharmaceutical prices,
which largely reflect perceptions of product value held by consumers,
physicians, and payers. Of course, it is possible that advertising reduces the
price responsiveness of demand and thus leads manufacturers to increase
prices, but the empirical evidence on this point is mixed.”).
245. See Walker, supra note 6, at 1259–60 (explaining Eric Zolt’s article
discussing the effect of tax penalties).
246. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 6, at 1275–79 (for an explanation of optimal
and complete deterrence).
247. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006) (stating that “[i]n the case of any publicly
held corporation, no deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for applicable
employee remuneration with respect to any covered employee to the extent that
the amount of such remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such
employee exceeds $1,000,000”).
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would be constitutional and the likely resulting decrease is
public exposure to DTCA is properly aligned with public
policy.
The First Amendment protects commercial-free
speech and does not allow Congress to discriminate on the
basis of content and speaker to restrict certain parties’ use
and access to information, but allows others. Under the First
Amendment, Congress also may not institute a law
preventing companies from spending money on protected
speech. These protections, however, do not require Congress
to continue to subsidize DTCA with a subsidy from the public
fisc.
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